发布时间 :2008-01-24 类型 : 转载（原为英文，此为译文）
关于阿拉伯和亚洲国家在华尔街的大肆购买，恐怕会引起潜在的强烈反应。
伯克南曾经表示，为了拯救美国的经济，如果必要的话，可以采用直升飞机往下撒钱。美联储主席大概没有想到的是，石油资源丰富的海湾国家和资金充裕的亚洲国家的直升飞机将盘旋在华尔街的上空。然后就是这样的一支队伍前来援助美国这个资本主义国家。
1 月 15 日，新加坡，科威特和南韩三国政府给花旗集团和美林证券集团提供特大援助，注入巨资 210 美元，这两家银行在美国的信贷危机中损失惨重。这也不是第一次运用发展中国家的储蓄赢余了，众所周知是主权财富基金。近几年来，发展中国家的主权财富基金逐渐增加，得益于石油价格高涨和出口增加。自从去年的次抵押贷款危机惨败发生以来，几乎把 690 亿美元的基金冒险地赌博于世界最大的投资银行，以此来重振资本主义经济（远远超过在新兴市场出现危机时所采用的方式）。用差不多 2.9 万亿的基金去投资，其基金的视野范围已经超过了电信和科技公司，赌场经营商，甚至航空宇宙。但是就银行而言，此次投入是引人注目的事情，当西方银行把全球金融系统的弱点和要害暴露出来时，他们很熟练地扮演了救世主的角色。
是金融家还是挑拨是非者
乍 看起来这正是资本主义制度运作的最好证明。金钱应该是从超额储蓄的国家流向急需金钱的国家。而不是在那里鼓吹自己的储备多么丰厚，阿拉伯和亚洲国家政府正是投资于他们所擅长的行业。但是这里有两个问题值得关注：第一，主权财富基金的缺点问题。第二，更大的问题是，他确实将激起保护贸易论者和民族主义者的强 烈反应。目前，法国总统 萨尔科奇允诺要保护法国的经营管理人员免遭“带有极端侵略性”的主权财富基金的侵害，（即使并没有对法国表现出太大的兴趣）。
虽然主权财富基金持有全球贸易资产的 2% ，但是他们发展很迅速，至少和全球对冲基金一样庞大，但是，不同于对冲基金的是，主权财富基金没有必要承受赢利和亏损的压力来运作。有一些例外，象挪威国家，大多数的主权财富基金都不展示投资目标是什么。
主 权财富基金投资于企业，对于公司的老板来说是一个天赐良机：被一个慎重的而又长期投资的投资者保释出来，自己可以继续工作，比在肮脏的对冲基金中被放弃要好得多。快速回顾那些国有行业的情况，简直是很乱很糟糕。并且不仅仅是效率的问题。主权基金人的动机是险恶的：抑制竞争，保护民族冠军，甚至参加、从事地 理政治捣乱行为。且不说他们的分裂市场的支配力，他们的经理很少对监管者，股东或者是选民负责，在这种情况下，几乎必然产生无赖贸易商。
到 目前为止，没有证据证明德国政府所呼吁的：主权财富基金投入是一种恶作剧行为。（好奇地，德国是另一个吸引主权财富基金眼光的国家）。衡量事情的风险，所以反对摆在眼前的现金支援，而且觉得是有臭味的钱，那么我们会马上觉得这是极其愚蠢的想法。美国目前的经济不景气或者其他；伯克南已经差一点允诺采用较为 激进的减息政策，但是他对美国银行系统的信心不足。有一个关于乞丐和施舍者的古老谚语：乞丐不能嫌饭稀，或者是饥不择食。
在美国，相对友好地欢迎主权财富基金可能是暂时的。在信贷危机之前，美国的政治家就反对阿拉伯国家拥有港口，中国拥有石油公司。 1 月 15 日希拉里克林顿表示：“我们必须加大努力控制主权基金的投资行为和控制其投资方式。”一旦危机情况过去之后，不再欢迎外国的资金的注入。新加坡的淡马锡基金在印度尼西亚的投资所付出的代价就是个最好的例子。
在 政治层面，呼吁恐慌的力量往往比单纯摆明原因要略胜一筹。要求发展中国家开发市场的同时，又对其的投资设置重重障碍的这种伪善之举是不证自明的。东道国不应当对主权财富基金设置特殊的制度。虽然每个国家都重视国家安全和财政金融的稳定，但是大多数国家都有保障银行的所有权和防卫的安全措施。
除非东西方的经济不会出现赢余和赤字，那么主权财政基金是不会消失的。在理想情况下，高储蓄的中东和亚洲国家是自由开放的经济政策，允许自己国家的公民投资，要好过付给其他官僚主义者为了他们自己的利益去投资。但是不要指望奇迹会出现，同时，更应该做的事情 是把保护主义的大棒从这些国家（全世界）的身上移走。
是照明还是采暖
一 开始，想要缓和对此事的关注，需要很长的时间去增加透明度：一份年度报告揭露说：该基金的动机和主要控股将是一个开始。通过第三方的投资，比如对冲基金，也可以为避免欺诈的行为多一层保护。在理想状况下，该基金将在个别的公司中持有比较少的股份，这样，会使他们必然要承受选股的风险和政治压力。不管怎样， 通过指数进行投资会更加多元化。
当 西方国家的政府最终学会让银行私有化运作时（然而有时做的不好），新兴市场经济的基金将要从银行中购买股份，甚至是少部分的，这种想法是不切实际的。另一方面，这样跨过边界，便宜交易的事情给发展中国家提供了一个直接参与到资本主义未来发展过程中的机会。主要的危险不在发展中国家。问题可能是在发达国家 ——对外国投资话题的日益敏感和紧张心理。
Capital markets
The invasion of the sovereign-wealth funds
Jan 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The biggest worry about rich Arab and Asian states buying up Wall Street is the potential backlash
BEN BERNANKE once spoke of dropping money from helicopters, if necessary, to save an economy in distress. The chairman of the Federal Reserve probably did not envisage that choppers bearing the insignia of oil-rich Gulf states and cash-rich Asian countries would hover over Wall Street. Yet just such a squadron has flown to the rescue of capitalism's finest.
On January 15th the governments of Singapore, Kuwait and South Korea provided much of a $21 billion lifeline to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, two banks that have lost fortunes in America's credit crisis. It was not the first time either had tapped the surplus savings of developing countries, known as sovereign-wealth funds, that have proliferated in recent years thanks to bumper oil prices and surging Asian exports. Since the subprime-mortgage fiasco unfolded last year, such funds have gambled almost $69 billion on recapitalising the rich world's biggest investment banks (far more than usually goes the other way in an emerging-markets crisis). With as much as $2.9 trillion to invest (see article), the funds' horizons go beyond finance to telecoms and technology companies, casino operators, even aerospace. But it is in banking where they have arrived most spectacularly. They have deftly played the role of saviour just when Western banks have been exposed as the Achilles heel of the global financial system.
At first sight this is proof that capitalism works. Money is flowing from countries with excess savings to those that need it. Rather than blowing their reserves on gargantuan schemes, Arab and Asian governments are investing it, relatively professionally. But there are still two sets of concerns. The first has to do with the shortcomings of sovereign-wealth funds. The second, bigger, problem is the backlash they will surely provoke from protectionists and nationalists. Already, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has promised to protect innocent French managers from the “extremely aggressive” sovereign funds (even though none has shown much interest in his country).
Although sovereign-wealth funds hold a bare 2% of the assets traded throughout the world, they are growing fast, and are at least as big as the global hedge-fund industry. But, unlike hedge funds, sovereign-wealth funds are not necessarily driven by the pressures of profit and loss. With a few exceptions (like Norway's), most do not even bother to reveal what their goals are—let alone their investments.
For the bosses at the companies they invest in, that may be a godsend: how nice to be bailed out by a discreet “long-termist” investor who lets you keep your job, rather than be forked out in the Augean clean-up hedge-fund types might demand. A quick glance back at “long-termist” nationalised industries shows what a mess that leads too. And it is not just a matter of efficiency. The motives of the sovereign moneymen could be sinister: stifling competition; protecting national champions; engaging, even, in geopolitical troublemaking. Despite their disruptive market power, their managers have little accountability to regulators, shareholders or voters. Such conditions are almost bound to produce rogue traders.
So far there is no evidence of such “mischievous” behaviour, as the German government calls it (curiously, from another country yet to attract the sovereign-wealth crowd). And weighing the risk of such eventualities against the rewards of hard cash, on the table, right now, makes it clearly daft to raise too much of a stink. America is either in recession or near one; Mr Bernanke has all but promised more aggressive rate cuts, but confidence in the banking system is low. There is a wise old proverb about beggars and choosers.
The relatively friendly welcome sovereign funds have found in America may be temporary. Before the credit crunch American politicians objected to Arabs owning ports and Chinese owning oil firms. On January 15th Hillary Clinton said: “We need to have a lot more control over what they [sovereign-wealth funds] do and how they do it.” Once an emergency has passed, foreign money can often be less welcome. One of Singapore's funds, Temasek, has learned that lesson to its cost in Indonesia.
In politics, appeals to fear usually sell better than those to reason. But the hypocrisy of erecting barriers to foreign investment while demanding open access to developing markets is self-evident. Host countries should not set up special regimes for sovereign wealth. Although every country has concerns about national security and financial stability, most already have safeguards for bank ownership and defence.
Until East and West even out the surpluses and deficits in their economies, sovereign-wealth funds will not go away. Ideally, the high-savings countries of the Middle East and Asia would liberalise their economies, allowing their own citizens to invest for themselves, rather than paying bureaucrats to do it for them. But do not expect miracles. In the meantime, what should be done to keep the rod of protectionism off their—and the world's—backs?
Shed light or take heat
For a start, more transparency would go a long way towards easing concerns: an annual report that discloses the fund's motives and main holdings would be a start. Investments through third parties, such as hedge funds, help too, providing an additional layer of protection against the misdeeds of rogues. Ideally, the funds would eventually take fewer stakes in individual companies, which expose them to the inevitable risks of stockpicking and political pressure. Investing across indices provides more diversification anyway.
At a time when Western governments have at last learned to let the private sector run banks (however lousily it is sometimes done), it is far from ideal that state-owned funds from emerging economies should be buying stakes in them, even minority ones. On the other hand, such cross-border bargain-hunting gives developing countries a bigger direct stake in capitalism's future. The chief danger will not lie with them. The problem is likely to be in the rich world—and a rising nervousness about foreign money.
